Missouri Law Review
Volume 85

Issue 3

Article 9

Summer 2020

A Judicial Balancing Act: Evaluating the First Amendment Claims
of Sitting Judges
Zeb J. Charlton

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Zeb J. Charlton, A Judicial Balancing Act: Evaluating the First Amendment Claims of Sitting Judges, 85
MO. L. REV. (2020)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss3/9

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

Charlton: A Judicial Balancing Act: Evaluating the First Amendment Claims o

NOTE
A Judicial Balancing Act: Evaluating
the First Amendment Claims of
Sitting Judges
In re Kemp, 894 F.3d 900 (8th Cir. 2018).
Zeb J. Charlton*

I.

INTRODUCTION

On April 14, 2017, members of the New Millennium Church in Little
Rock, Arkansas, gathered outside of Arkansas’s Governor’s Mansion to
protest capital punishment.1 The mansion’s resident, Governor Asa
Hutchinson, had recently scheduled eight executions for the month of April.2
Two members of the congregation held signs reading, “Other states are trying
to abolish the death penalty[,] mine’s putting it on express lane.”3 New
Millennium Church’s lead minister Wendell Griffen lay on a cot in front of
his parishioners to symbolize the use of capital punishment on Jesus Christ.4

*

B.A., University of Missouri, 2018; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School
of Law, 2021; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2019-2020. I am grateful
to Dean Paul Litton and Dean Lyrissa Lidsky for their insight, guidance, and support
during the writing of this Note, as well as the Missouri Law Review for its help in the
editing process.
1. Andrew DeMillo, Arkansas Judge Who Joined Protest Barred From
Execution
Case,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
NEWS,
April
18,
2017,
https://apnews.com/908e24606d5a4f31adf3615ffdcb5884/arkansas-judge-whojoined-protest-barred-execution-case [https://perma.cc/U2Q6-A9XK].
2. Shawna Meyers, Arkansas Governor Releases Execution Dates for Eight
Death
Row
Inmates,
KFSM-TV
(Feb.
27,
2017
2:28
PM),
https://5newsonline.com/2017/02/27/arkansas-governor-releases-execution-datesfor-eight-death-row-inmates/ [https://perma.cc/G79C-W26W].
3. Assoc. Press, Outcry After Arkansas Judge Who Stayed Executions Joins
Anti-death
Penalty
Rally,
THE
GUARDIAN,
Apr.
15,
2017,
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/apr/15/arkansas-executions-judgewendell-griffen-death-penalty-protest [https://perma.cc/Q7TE-EDEL].
4. Wendell Griffen, One Year Later, JUSTICE IS A VERB! (April 18, 2018),
http://wendelllgriffen.blogspot.com/2018/04/one-year-later.html
[https://perma.cc/F823-8JEN].
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In addition to serving as pastor of New Millennium Church, Wendell
Griffen serves as an elected judge on Arkansas’s Sixth Judicial Circuit.5 On
the same day as the protest, Judge Griffen was assigned to oversee a drug
manufacturer’s lawsuit involving Arkansas’s use of the drug vecuronium
bromide in executions.6 Judge Griffen granted the drug manufacturer’s
request for a temporary restraining order, preventing the use of vecuronium
bromide in Arkansas executions until further notice.7 Arkansas’s Attorney
General immediately appealed Judge Griffen’s order, arguing that Judge
Griffen’s participation in the Governor’s Mansion protest and subsequent
ruling violated Arkansas’s Code of Judicial Ethics.8 The Attorney General
requested that Judge Griffen’s temporary restraining order be overruled and
that Judge Griffen be removed from further proceedings in the instant case.9
The Arkansas Supreme Court subsequently overruled Judge Griffen’s
temporary restraining order and removed Judge Griffen from all present and
future cases involving capital punishment.10 Judge Griffen filed suit against
the Arkansas Supreme Court, alleging, inter alia, that his First Amendment
freedom of speech rights had been violated.11
The proper constitutional standard for evaluating the First Amendment
claims of sitting judges has been an open question since Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White.12 This Note argues the balancing test governing the First
Amendment rights of public employees created in Pickering v. Board of
Education13 should be used to adjudicate the First Amendment suits of active
state judges. Pickering’s balancing test is then applied to the First
Amendment retaliation claims of Judge Wendell Griffen against the Arkansas
Supreme Court and its justices to demonstrate the operation of the balancing
test in this context.14 The Note concludes with a short discussion of permanent
reassignment, the Arkansas Supreme Court’s selected remedy in this case.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Unlike the majority of judges in the American judicial system, Judge
Wendell Griffen of Arkansas’s Sixth Circuit does not shy away from
commenting on public issues.15 The Judge describes himself on Twitter as a
“Pastor, judge, social justice advocate, and consultant on cultural competency,

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

DeMillo, supra note 1.
In re Kemp, 894 F.3d 900, 904 (8th Cir. 2018).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 904–905.
Id. at 905.
536 U.S. 765 (2002).
391 U.S. 563 (1968).
See id.; In re Kemp, 894 F.3d at 905.
See infra text accompanying notes 16–22.
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justice, and relation between faith and public policy.”16 From December 2014
to January 2019, Griffen regularly posted political, religious, and social
commentary on his personal blog titled “Justice is a Verb!”17 Judge Griffen
blogged on contemporary political topics such as President Donald Trump,18
the contentious nomination of Justice Brett Kavanaugh,19 and white
supremacy.20
Judge Griffen also frequently disclosed his personal views of the death
penalty on “Justice is a Verb!”21 On April 10, 2017, Judge Griffen’s post
entitled “Religious Faith and Homicidal Motives During the Holy Week”
contained the following statement:
Premeditated and deliberate killing of defenseless persons—including
defenseless persons who have been convicted of murder—is not
morally justifiable. Using medications designed for treating illness
and preserving life to engage in such premeditated and deliberate
killing is not morally justifiable. Any morally unjustified and
unjustifiable killing produces moral injury. Beginning a week from
today, and three days after Good Friday—on Monday, April 17—the
political, religious, commercial, and social captains of empire in
Arkansas will commence a series of morally unjustified and
unjustifiable killings. Each death will be a new, and permanent, moral
injury. These deaths will join the existing long list of atrocities,
oppression, and other moral injuries associated with our state to cause
people around the world to associate Arkansas with bigotry, hate, and
other forms of injustice as long as human memory continues.22

16. Wendell Griffen (@Judggriff) Twitter (last visited Sept. 25, 2020),
https://twitter.com/judggriff?lang=en [https://perma.cc/M86C-GRCT].
17. Wendell Griffen, Trump’s Shutdown: A Malicious Spectacle of Moral,
Political and Humanitarian Failure, JUSTICE IS A VERB! (Jan. 16, 2019),
https://wendelllgriffen.blogspot.com/ [https://perma.cc/3RC8-N6RN].
18. Wendell Griffen, Treating Donald Trump like a Psychopath, JUSTICE IS A
VERB! (Dec.26, 2018), https://wendelllgriffen.blogspot.com/2018/12/treating-donaldtrump-like-psychopath_26.html [https://perma.cc/669S-QXA3]; Wendell Griffen,
IS
A
VERB!
(July
17,
2018),
Imbecile
in
Chief,
JUSTICE
https://wendelllgriffen.blogspot.com/2018/07/imbecile-in-chief.html
[https://perma.cc/VY23-24HF].
19. Wendell Griffen, Lessons to Remember About the Kavanaugh Spectacle,
JUSTICE
IS
A
VERB!
(Sept.
28,
2018),
https://wendelllgriffen.blogspot.com/2018/09/lessons-to-remember-aboutkavanaugh.html [https://perma.cc/4PDC-UYZK].
20. Wendell Griffen, The Dominant Religion of the United States is White
Supremacy,
JUSTICE
IS
A
VERB!
(July
11,
2018),
https://wendelllgriffen.blogspot.com/2018/07/the-dominant-religion-of-unitedstates.html [https://perma.cc/JH83-8D5V].
21. Griffen, supra note 4.
22. Wendell Griffen, Religious Faith and Homicidal Motives during Holy Week,
JUSTICE
IS
A
VERB!
(Apr.
10,
2017),
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Later that week, on April 14, Judge Griffen participated in an anti-death
penalty rally at the Governor’s Mansion.23 Judge Griffen subsequently led a
prayer vigil with his congregation outside of the Governor’s Mansion.24 After
the vigil concluded, Judge Griffen laid on a cot “in solidarity with Jesus.”25
On the same day, McKesson Medical-Surgical, Inc., a distributor of the
drug vecuronium bromide,26 sued the State of Arkansas, the Arkansas
Department of Corrections, Arkansas Governor Asa Hutchinson, and
Arkansas Department of Corrections Director Wendy Kelley.27 The suit was
assigned to Judge Griffen.28 McKesson argued the State had obtained the drug
under false pretenses and requested the State return the drug before it was used
in any executions.29 McKesson sought a temporary restraining order (“TRO”)
in the case.30 On April 14, Judge Griffen granted McKesson’s request for a
TRO, preventing the State from “us[ing] the vecuronium bromide obtained
from [McKesson] until ordered otherwise by this Court.”31
The Arkansas Attorney General subsequently filed an emergency
petition seeking a writ of mandamus with the Arkansas Supreme Court.32 The
Attorney General requested the Arkansas Supreme Court vacate Judge
Griffen’s TRO and remove Judge Griffen from further proceedings in the
case.33 The Attorney General’s brief stated that Judge Griffen’s past conduct,
primarily his protest on April 14, violated Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct
Rule 2.11(A)(5).34 Notably, the Attorney General’s emergency petition
https://wendelllgriffen.blogspot.com/2017/04/religious-faith-and-homicidalmotives.html [https://perma.cc/CJG6-VLRN].
23. In re Kemp, 894 F.3d 900, 904 (8th Cir. 2018).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Vecuronium bromide is a muscle relaxant typically used in conjunction with
anesthesia. Mark Ramzy & Russell K. McAllister, Vecuronium, NAT’L CTR. FOR
BIOTECHNOLOGY INFORMATION, U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY OF MEDICINE (Mar. 27, 2020),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK493143/ [https://perma.cc/BC4C-7END].
Arkansas uses vecuronium bromide as the second drug in a three-drug execution
protocol. Linda Satter, In Filing, AG Cites 3-Drug Decision; State Urges Look in
Execution
Case,
ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE,
Sept.
22,
2019,
https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2019/sep/22/in-filing-ag-cites-3-drugdecision-2019/ [https://perma.cc/LXM7-GPM6]; see also In re Kemp, 894 F.3d at
904.
27. In re Kemp, 894 F.3d at 904 (Governor Hutchinson and Director Kelley were
sued in their official capacity).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34.
A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in
which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned,
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hinted Judge Griffen would be unfit to hear any death penalty case, arguing
that “Judge Griffen cannot be considered remotely impartial on issues related
to the death penalty.”35
On April 17, the Arkansas Supreme Court granted the Attorney
General’s mandamus petition.36 In granting the petition, the court went
beyond the stated request of the Attorney General, and “immediately
reassigned all cases in the Fifth Division that involve the death penalty or the
state’s execution protocol, whether civil or criminal.”37 In a lone published
dissent, Chief Justice John Dan Kemp would have only removed Judge
Griffen from the present case, citing the lack of formal investigation into
Judge Griffen’s alleged bias in capital punishment cases.38 The Arkansas
Supreme Court also referred Judge Griffen to the “Judicial Discipline and
Disability Commission to consider whether he ha[d] violated the Code of
Judicial Conduct.”39
Judge Griffen sued the Arkansas Supreme Court and its justices in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas.40 Judge
Griffen brought his claim under several grounds, including: First Amendment
freedom of speech retaliation, First Amendment religious exercise retaliation,
violation of Arkansas’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act, denial of his
Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights, violation of his
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights, and civil conspiracy.41
The justices of the Arkansas Supreme Court filed a motion to dismiss,
arguing that Judge Griffen had stated no plausible grounds for relief.42 The
district judge refused to grant the Arkansas Supreme Court justices’ motion
to dismiss.43 On April 13, Judge Griffen sought discovery on the Arkansas
Supreme Court’s internal deliberations regarding Judge Griffen’s temporary
restraining order and subsequent litigation.44 On April 24, the Arkansas
Supreme Court justices petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the
including but not limited to the following circumstances: The
judge, while a judge or a judicial candidate, has made a public
statement, other than in a court proceeding, judicial decision, or
opinion, that commits or appears to commit the judge to reach a
particular result or rule in a particular way in the proceeding or
controversy.
In re Kemp, 894 F.3d at 904 (quoting Ark. Code Jud. Conduct R. 2.11(A)(5)).
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. In re Pulaski County Circuit Court, No. 17-155, 2017 Ark. LEXIS 154
(2017) at *2 (per curiam).
37. Id.
38. Id. at *4–5 (Kemp, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
39. Id. at *2.
40. In re Kemp, 894 F.3d at 905.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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Eighth Circuit for a writ of mandamus preventing Judge Griffen from
engaging in discovery.45
In a two-to-one decision, the Eighth Circuit granted the Arkansas
Supreme Court justices’ mandamus petition and vacated the district court’s
denial of the justices’ motion to dismiss.46 However, the court refused to
discuss the justices’ argument that allowing discovery to proceed would
interfere with “judicial independence and federalism.”47 The court believed
it would be unnecessary to wade into the delicate area of federal-state relations
if Judge Griffen failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted.48
In the lone dissenting opinion, Judge Kelly would have granted the
Arkansas Supreme Court justices’ petition for a writ of mandamus, but only
regarding Judge Griffen’s discovery attempt.49 In Judge Kelly’s view, the
petitioners in the case did not adequately exhaust their remedies at the district
court level.50 Judge Kelly reasoned that, without a total exhaustion of
remedies at the lower level, the petitioners still had other adequate means to
find the relief they desired, and the court should reject the mandamus
petition.51 Judge Kelly would later cast the sole vote in favor of granting
Judge Griffen’s motion for a rehearing en banc,52 but did not file an opinion
detailing her reasoning.53
In June 2019, the Arkansas Judicial Discipline and Disability
Commission dismissed the pending ethics action against Judge Griffen.54
Pursuant to this dismissal, Judge Griffen petitioned the Arkansas Supreme
Court to reinstate his ability to hear death penalty cases.55 The Arkansas
Supreme Court denied Judge Griffen’s petition in a per curiam order, ruling
that Judge Griffen had not filed a timely petition for rehearing.56

45. Id.
46. Id. at 910.
47. Id. at 905.
48. Id. (“[T]his court express[es] no view on [the Arkansas Supreme Court’s
federalism argument], because it is clear and indisputable that the discovery sought by
Judge Griffen is not relevant to any claim that should survive a motion to dismiss.”)
(internal quotations omitted).
49. Id. at 910–11 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 910.
51. Id.
52. In re Kemp, No. 18-1864, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 24581, at *1 (Aug. 29,
2018).
53. Id.
54. Debra Cassens Weiss, Ethics Case is Tossed Against Judge Who Protested
Death Penalty While Ruling in Execution Drug Dispute, ABA JOURNAL, June 14,
2019, http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ethics-case-is-tossed-against-judgewho-protested-death-penalty-while-ruling-in-execution-drug-dispute
[https://perma.cc/J698-5J6X].
55. Id.
56. In re Griffen, No. CV-19-521, 2019 Ark. 251, at *1 (Sept. 19, 2019).
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The proper framework for analyzing the extrajudicial speech of sitting
judges has been the subject of disagreement among twenty-first century
scholars and courts.57 The United States Supreme Court’s decisions have
offered little guidance on the First Amendment protections of sitting judges.58
This has led to conflicting lines of case law when analyzing the First
Amendment claims of the judiciary. The majority of federal and state courts
have followed the seminal judicial campaign case Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White, which invalidated a provision of Minnesota’s Code of
Judicial Conduct under strict scrutiny.59 In the alternative, some courts and
commentators believe active judges’ First Amendment rights should be
evaluated under the same public employee balancing test established in
Pickering v. Board Of Education.60

A. The White Approach
For the majority of this nation’s history, judges freely engaged in overt
political activities,61 such as soliciting funds for partisan candidates,62
endorsing candidates for elected office,63 and even seeking the presidency.64
In 1924, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) released the first Canon of
Judicial Ethics.65 Heavily inspired by former President and sitting Chief
Justice William H. Taft, the initial Canon “specifically suggested that judges
refrain from making political speeches, making or soliciting contributions for
political parties, publicly endorsing candidates, and participating in party
conventions.”66 However, the ABA only intended the first Canon to be an
aspirational model of ideal judicial conduct, and judges continued to actively
partake in politics.67
The advent of judicial disciplinary commissions, which actively
enforced long-ignored codes of judicial ethics, began to curb the political
activities of state judges in the late twentieth century.68 State regulation of
57. See Lynne H. Rambo, When Should the First Amendment Protect Judges
from Their Unethical Speech?, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 279 (2018).
58. Id. at 283.
59. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
60. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
61. Raymond J. McKoski, The Political Activities Of Judges: Historical,
Constitutional, And Self-Preservation Perspectives, 80 U. PITT. L. REV. 245, 249–
56 (2018).
62. Id. at 256; Am. Bar Ass’n, CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS (1924).
63. McKoski, supra note 61, at 256–257.
64. Id. at 263.
65. Id. at 250.
66. Id. at 257–58.
67. Id. at 263.
68. Id. at 250.
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judicial conduct and campaigns remained largely unchallenged until the
Supreme Court’s decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,69 which
cast significant doubt on the constitutionality of judicial campaign
restrictions.
In White, the Supreme Court held that a state could not prohibit judicial
candidates from discussing political or legal issues on the campaign trail.70 At
issue in White was Minnesota’s “announce clause,” which stated that a
“‘candidate for a judicial office, including an incumbent judge,’ shall not
‘announce his or her views on disputed legal or political issues.’”71 Both
parties agreed that strict scrutiny72 should be used in evaluating the announce
clause.73 Writing for a five-to-four majority, Justice Scalia rejected
Minnesota’s arguments that the announce clause was narrowly tailored to
serve the compelling government interest of “preserving the impartiality of
the state judiciary and preserving the appearance of the impartiality of the
state judiciary.”74 In striking down the announce clause, the White majority
emphasized the role the provision played in the election context:
Debate on the qualifications of candidates is at the core of our electoral
process and of the First Amendment freedoms, not at the edges. The
role that elected officials play in our society makes it all the more
imperative that they be allowed freely to express themselves on
matters of current public importance. It is simply not the function of
government to select which issues are worth discussing or debating in
the course of a political campaign. We have never allowed the
government to prohibit candidates from communicating relevant
information to voters during an election.75

Justice Scalia’s frequent references to judicial elections in the preceding
text are noteworthy. In couching his opinion in the language of electoral
politics, Justice Scalia casts serious doubt on the impact of White outside of
judicial campaign restrictions. Further, Justice O’Connor’s concurring
opinion and Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion placed particular
importance on the electoral aspect of White. Justice O’Connor wrote a
separate concurring opinion for the sole purpose of questioning the soundness
69. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 769 (2002).
70. Id. at 796.
71. Id. at 769 (quoting Minn. Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i)
(2000)).
72. Under strict scrutiny, the state actor must show that a disputed action is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. Id. at 774–75 (citing
Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222, (1989)).
In a challenge to a government action on First Amendment grounds, the government
must demonstrate the action does not “unnecessarily circumscribe protected
expression.” Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 54 (1982).
73. White, 536 U.S. at 775.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 781–82 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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of judicial elections.76 On the other side, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent attacked
the White majority for what she viewed as a failure to distinguish between
legislative and judicial elections77 – an argument rejected by Justice Scalia in
dicta.78
Thirteen years later, the Supreme Court officially extended White’s use
of strict scrutiny to all judicial campaign cases in Williams-Yulee v. Florida
Bar.79 Lanell Williams-Yulee, an aspiring judicial candidate, challenged
Florida’s ban on the personal solicitation of campaign funds.80 Unlike the
parties in White, the Williams-Yulee litigants disagreed on the proper
constitutional standard. The Florida Bar adopted the position that the law
should be evaluated under the looser “‘closely drawn’ to match a ‘sufficiently
important interest’”81 test used in campaign contribution cases.82 WilliamsYulee argued White83 required the Court to apply strict scrutiny.84
The Supreme Court agreed with Williams-Yulee and applied strict
scrutiny to determine if the ban was constitutional,85 reasoning that the
“closely drawn” standard is only applicable to claims involving the First
Amendment’s right to free association.86 Even though the Florida Bar lost the
battle over the proper constitutional standard, the Court determined the
personal solicitation clause was “one of the rare cases in which a speech
restriction withstands strict scrutiny.”87
Like the “announce clause” at issue in White,88 the Williams-Yulee court
found that preventing judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign
funds protects the “‘vital state interest’ in safeguarding ‘public confidence in

76. Id. at 788 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 805 (Ginsburg, J, dissenting) (“I do not agree with this unilocular, ‘an
election is an election,’ approach.”).
78. Id. (“[D]espite the number of pages [Justice Ginsburg] dedicates to
disproving this proposition…we neither assert nor imply that the First Amendment
requires campaigns for judicial office to sound the same as those for legislative
office.”).
79. 575 U.S. 433 (2015).
80. Id. at 439–42 (citing Fla. Fla. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7(C)(1)
(2012)).
81. Id. at 443 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam)).
82. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
83. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
84. Williams-Yulee, 575 U.S. at 441.
85. Id. at 443 (“As we have long recognized, speech about public issues and the
qualifications of candidates for elected office [which the fundraising letter included]
commands the highest level of First Amendment protection. Indeed, in our only prior
case concerning speech restrictions on a candidate for judicial office, [Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White,] this Court and both parties assumed that strict scrutiny
applied.”).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 444–45.
88. Supra text accompanying notes 71–75.
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the fairness and integrity of the nation’s elected judges.’”89 Florida’s ban on
personal solicitation was found to be narrowly tailored to protect against “a
public appearance that undermines confidence in the integrity of the
judiciary,”90 and the regulation was deemed constitutional.91

B. The Pickering Approach
In Pickering v. Board of Education,92 the Supreme Court firmly
established that public employees do not forfeit free speech as a condition of
public employment.93 The Pickering plaintiff, a public schoolteacher, was
terminated for writing a letter to a local newspaper criticizing the school
district’s recent method for raising revenue.94 The local school board
determined Pickering’s letter was “detrimental to the efficient operation and
administration of the schools of the district” and that “[the] interests of the
school require[d] [his dismissal].”95
The Pickering court applied a balancing test that weighed “the interests
of [Pickering], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and
the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees.”96 As a statement on
“matter of legitimate public concern,” the Court afforded great weight to
Pickering’s First Amendment rights.97 On the other hand, since the letter had
not “impeded the teacher’s proper performance of his daily duties in
classroom or to have interfered with the regular operation of the schools
generally,”98 the State did not have a legitimate reason for terminating
Pickering. Since the balancing test tipped in Pickering’s favor, the Court ruled
the school board had violated Pickering’s First Amendment rights.99
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has further fleshed out the
requirements for Pickering’s balancing test. The first inquiry is whether the
employee “spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern.”100 Broadly
speaking, an employee cannot satisfy this prong of the balancing test if the
speech is closely related to the work the employee is compensated for.101 If
89. Williams-Yulee, 575 U.S. at 445 (quoting Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal
Co., 556 U.S. 868, 889 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
90. Id. at 453–54.
91. Id. at 457.
92. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
93. Id. at 574–75.
94. Id. at 564.
95. Id. at 564-65.
96. Id. at 571.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) (citing Pickering v. Bd. of
Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
101. Id. at 420–21.
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the government employee cannot demonstrate they spoke on a matter of
public concern, they cannot state a viable First Amendment retaliation
claim.102
If the employee’s speech was on a matter of public concern, then the
court must determine if “the interest of the state, as an employer, in promoting
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees’
outweighs ‘the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon
matters of public concern.’”103 The employee’s speech will only be
unprotected if the state’s interest is greater than the citizen’s.104

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In a two-to-one decision, the Eighth Circuit held Judge Griffen did not
state a plausible claim for relief under Section 1983 for First Amendment
retaliation.105 The Eighth Circuit reasoned that Judge Griffen did not allege
he was engaged in a protected activity, and that Judge Griffen suffered no
adverse employment action.106
The Eighth Circuit ruled that the Arkansas Supreme Court’s recusal
order exclusively affected Judge Griffen’s role as a public employee.107 The
court cited Bauer v. Shepard’s108 finding that a judicial recusal clause only
affects the First Amendment rights of a judicial candidate in his or her official
capacity, not as a private citizen.109 Further citing Bauer, the Eighth Circuit
determined “[t]he state, as employer, may control how its employees perform
their work, even when that work includes speech (as a judge’s job does).”110
Like all other public employees, cases may be reassigned to judges who have
not made inflammatory public statements about a pending case or an issue in
a case.111
102. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (“When employee expression
cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other
concern to the community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in
managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the
First Amendment.”).
103. Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct.
2448, 2471 (2018) (quoting Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616, 653 (2014)).
104. Id.
105. In re Kemp, 894 F.3d at 906.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 620 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that a state’s ban on judge’s political
campaigning activities did not violate the First Amendment’s Freedom of Speech
clause).
109. Bauer v. Shephard, 620 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2010).
110. Id. (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006)).
111. In re Kemp, 894 F.3d at 906 (citing Bauer, 620 F.3d at 718); see also Ligon
v. City of New York, 736 F.3d 166, 169 n.8 (2d Cir. 2013) (“The freedom of speech
protected by the First Amendment does not mean that there can be no limitations, such
as those contemplated under section 455(a), on what a federal judge may say, much
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Judge Griffen also failed to allege that he had suffered an adverse
employment action. An adverse employment action “produces a material
employment disadvantage.”112 The Eighth Circuit listed a non-exhaustive
collection of adverse employment actions, such as termination and a cut in
pay or benefits.113 Additionally, circumstances which effectively create a
constructive discharge are an actionable adverse employment action.114
In ruling that Judge Griffen did not suffer an adverse employment action,
the Eighth Circuit followed Bauer’s reasoning that a public employee has no
right to perform any particular task.115 The court implicitly argued that states
have a compelling interest in assigning judges to hear particular cases as a
safeguard of litigants’ Due Process rights.116 The court followed with the
conclusory statement that “[r]ecusal from death penalty cases is not an adverse
employment action.”117

V. COMMENT
The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”118 The
First Amendment’s prohibition against Congressional speech restrictions has
been incorporated against state government action through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.119 The United States Supreme Court
also extended First Amendment protection to online speech in Reno v.
American Civil Liberties Union.120 Therefore, Judge Griffen’s blog posts on
“Justice is a Verb!” are entitled to the same First Amendment protections as
his in-person protest.121

less on where she can say it, especially as it relates to pending litigation… [N]umerous
courts of appeals have reassigned cases due to an appearance of partiality that was
traceable to speech by a district judge.”).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. (quoting Kerns v. Capital Graphics, Inc., 178 F.3d 1011, 1016 (8th Cir.
1999)).
115. Id.
116. Id. (quoting Bauer, 620 F.3d at 718) (“A state may decide to assign each case
to a judge whose impartiality is not in question . . . States are entitled to protect litigants
by assigning impartial judges before the fact, as well as by removing partial judges
afterward.”).
117. Id. at 907.
118. U.S. CONST. amend I.
119. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
120. 521 U.S. 844 (1996).
121. Reno, 521 U.S. at 844.
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A. Which Constitutional Standard Should Courts Apply?
While the majority of courts have followed White and evaluated judges’
free speech claims under strict scrutiny,122 Pickering’s balancing test should
be used to evaluate extrajudicial speech that does not occur as part of a judicial
campaign. The most faithful application of White’s holding requires a careful
evaluation of the circumstances surrounding the judicial official’s speech.
This context-specific approach was applied by the Seventh Circuit in Siefert
v. Alexander.123
In Siefert,124 the Seventh Circuit upheld Wisconsin’s Code of Judicial
Ethics provisions banning political endorsements and personal solicitation,
but struck down the code’s prohibition on partisan identification as a violation
of the First Amendment.125 The Siefert court evaluated the provisions relating
to personal solicitation and partisan identification under strict scrutiny,126 but
argued Pickering’s balancing test was well-suited to evaluate the political
endorsement restriction.127 The court reasoned that “offering an endorsement
is less a judge’s communication about his qualifications and beliefs than an
effort to affect a separate political campaign, or even more problematically,
assume a role as political powerbroker.”128 Thus, the Siefert court partially
chose Pickering’s balancing test as a pragmatic solution to permit regulation
of some judicial political activity while still operating within the confines of
the First Amendment.
While applying the balancing test set forth in Pickering, the Siefert court
also adopted the additional factor of promoting judicial integrity in favor of
the state.129 The Seifert court noted the state’s power to regulate employees’
First Amendment activities – in cases such as Pickering,130 Connick,131 and

122. See, e.g., Wolfson v. Concannon, 811 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2016) (applying
strict scrutiny to judge’s challenge of Arizona’s Judicial Ethics code prohibition on
personal solicitation, campaigning, and endorsements); Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d
189 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying strict scrutiny to judge’s challenge of Michigan’s
identification, solicitation, and commitment clauses); Jenevein v. Willing, 493 F.3d
551 (5th Cir. 2007) (applying strict scrutiny in evaluating judge’s First Amendment
claim based on disciplinary action).
123. Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974 (7th Cir. 2010).
124. 608 F.3d 974 (7th Cir. 2010).
125. Id. at 977.
126. Id. at 981.
127. Id. at 985–86.
128. Id. at 984.
129. Id. at 985.
130. Pickering v. Bd. of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
131. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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Garcetti132 – is not only based on the government’s role as employer, but also
on the duty the state possesses to guarantee its citizens due process of law.133
The rationale behind the White decision also cuts against applying strict
scrutiny to extrajudicial speech outside of campaigns. As noted previously,
Justice Scalia emphasized the importance of an informed electorate in striking
down Minnesota’s announce clause.134 Indeed, Justice Kennedy’s concurring
opinion in White strikes against applying White to extrajudicial speech outside
of the campaign context:
This case does not present the question whether a State may restrict
the speech of judges because they are judges – for example, as part of
a code of judicial conduct; the law at issue here regulates judges only
when and because they are candidates. Whether the rationale of
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968), and Connick
v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), could be extended to allow a general
speech restriction on sitting judges – regardless of whether they are
campaigning – in order to promote the efficient administration of
justice, is not an issue raised here.
Petitioner Gregory Wersal was not a sitting judge but a challenger; he
had not voluntarily entered into an employment relationship with the
State or surrendered any First Amendment rights.135

The best analysis of Justice Kennedy’s reasoning cabins White’s
application of strict scrutiny to judicial campaigns. In the most favorable
reading for strict scrutiny, Justice Kennedy’s opinion leaves the door ajar for
courts to choose between Pickering’s balancing test and White’s stringent
approach. But reading Justice Kennedy’s opinion as an endorsement of strict
scrutiny cannot be reconciled with the majority’s reasoning. In light of Justice
Scalia’s opinion – which deals in the language of electoral politics136 – the
better conclusion is that White offers no guidance to the First Amendment
rights of sitting judges.
Further, applying a balancing test to sitting judges’ First Amendment
claims is a more practical solution than applying strict scrutiny. State and
local governments have a “legitimate purpose in ‘[promoting] efficiency and

132. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
133. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 985 (“We are not concerned merely with the efficiency
of those services, but that the work of the judiciary conforms with the due process
requirements of the Constitution.”).
134. See Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 782 (2002) (“It
is simply not the function of government to select which issues are worth discussing
or debating in the course of a political campaign. We have never allowed the
government to prohibit candidates from communicating relevant information to voters
during an election.”) (emphasis added).
135. Id. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
136. See text accompanying supra notes 75–78.
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integrity in the discharge of official duties.’”137 To require the state to prove
that every judicial disciplinary action and rule promulgated is “narrowly
tailored to further a compelling government interest” would burden state and
federal courts with litigation relating to the constitutionality of judicial speech
restrictions,138 frustrating the government’s interest in efficient court services.
Because the underlying rationale of White cuts against applying strict
scrutiny to Judge Griffen’s conduct outside of an active judicial campaign, the
Pickering balancing test should be applied.

B. Applying Pickering’s Balancing Test
Judge Griffen brought a First Amendment retaliation claim under
Section 1983.139 A First Amendment retaliation claim must allege: (1) the
plaintiff engaged in a protected activity; (2) a government official’s actions
against the plaintiff “would chill a person of ordinary firmness from
continuing in the activity”;140 and (3) the government official’s adverse action
was at least partially motivated by the plaintiff’s exercise of the protected
activity.141
To proceed with his First Amendment retaliation claim, Judge Griffen
must first allege that his speech was on a matter of public concern.142 In the
Eighth Circuit, courts analyze the “content, form, and context of a given
statement, as revealed by the whole record” to determine if the speech in
question touched on an issue of public concern.143
Judge Griffen’s protest at the Governor’s Mansion was plainly on a
matter of public concern.144 The imposition of the death penalty in the United
States has been the cause of much public debate, with members of the
judiciary frequently thrusting themselves into the center of the conflict.145

137. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150–51 (1983) (quoting Ex parte Curtis,
106 U.S. 371, 373 (1882)).
138. Rambo, supra note 57 at 307–08 (“Requiring that every ethics rule to which
a sitting judge is subject be narrowly tailored to its end would place an extraordinary
burden on the State.”).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
140. Revelz v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 876 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Naucke v.
City of Park Hills, 284 F.3d 923, 927–28 (8th Cir. 2002)).
141. In re Kemp, 894 F.3d 900, 906 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Revels v. Vincenz,
382 F.3d 870, 876 (8th Cir. 2004)).
142. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) (citing Pickering v. Bd. of
Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
143. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148–149 (1983).
144. Ziccarelli v. Leake, 767 F. Supp. 1450, 1454 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (deciding that
character testimony at a death penalty hearing was speech on a matter of public
concern).
145. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 231–32 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he death penalty is constitutionally invalid for two reasons. First, the death
penalty is excessive. And second, the American people, fully informed as to the
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Candidates in contested judicial elections often emphasize their personal
views on capital punishment in a calculated move to sway the electorate.146
Additionally, in determining whether the application of the death penalty
violates the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court has placed special
emphasis on the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.”147 The need for robust public debate on the topic of capital
punishment is required to determine the “evolving standards of decency,”
whether that be determined through public polling or legislative action.148
Next, it must be determined whether the speech occurred in the course
of Judge Griffen’s duties as a member of the judiciary. As articulated in
Garcetti v. Ceballos,149 the determinative question is whether the expression
took place during an activity that the government would compensate the
employee for.150 Judge Griffen was not acting within the scope of his official
duties while protesting in front of the Governor’s Mansion. Presumably,
Judge Griffen’s responsibilities as a circuit judge include matters such as
reviewing court filings, hearing cases, and meeting with attorneys. Notably,
none of these duties involve Judge Griffen holding a protest against the state
of Arkansas’s use of capital punishment, leading a prayer ritual outside of the
Governor’s Mansion, or imitating Jesus’s three days in the tomb.151 Judge
Griffen’s conduct fits comfortably within other instances of government
employees acting outside the scope of their employment in protest.152
But Judge Griffen was not reprimanded solely for his participation in the
Governor’s Mansion protest or his blog posts. Instead, Judge Griffen was
subject to judicial discipline for failing to recuse himself as required by
Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11(A)(5),153 which instructs that
purposes of the death penalty and its liabilities, would in my view reject it as morally
unacceptable.”) (internal citations omitted).
146. Stephen B. Bright and Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death:
Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U.L.
REV. 760 (1995) (discussing the political consequences of capital punishment cases
for elected judges).
147. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
148. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 426 (2008) (noting that at the
time of decision, only six states permitted the death penalty for child rape of any kind).
149. 547 U.S. 410, 420–21 (2006).
150. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 420–21 (2006).
151. Compare Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422 (“Ceballos did not act as a citizen when
he went about conducting his daily professional activities, such as supervising
attorneys, investigating charges, and preparing filings. In the same way he did not
speak as a citizen by writing a memo that addressed the proper disposition of a pending
criminal case.”).
152. Pickering v. Bd. of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (finding that a
schoolteacher’s letter to a local newspaper was outside the scope of his employment);
Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987) (finding that a government employee’s
wishful remark to a co-worker that the President was assassinated was outside the
scope of the employee’s duties).
153. See text accompanying supra notes 32–39.
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“[a] judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”154 A judge’s recusal
decision may be dependent on the judge’s conduct as a private citizen, but the
actual recusal action is made as a public employee. Therefore, a judge’s
recusal decision is wholly within Garcetti’s scope of employment standard.155
As Judge Griffen was not speaking on a matter of public concern as a private
citizen, Judge Griffen cannot even trigger Pickering’s balancing test.
Even if Judge Griffen did speak as a private citizen on a matter of public
concern, he still cannot state a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim.
The final step of the Pickering analysis, in the judicial context, is the interest
of the state in promoting efficient services and ensuring the due process rights
of litigants.156 In addition to ensuring a smooth functioning court system, the
judicial system also promotes the effectiveness of its services through the
perceived impartiality of its judges.157
The final factor of the balancing test weighs in the state’s favor. Looking
at the context of Judge Griffen’s comments and protests, the state had a
legitimate interest in removing Judge Griffen from the McKesson case. Judge
Griffen’s blog post on April 10 is a clear reference to the upcoming April 17
execution. Even though Judge Griffen did not directly mention McKesson in
the April 10 blog post, his comments necessarily implicated the pending
litigation. Further, Judge Griffen’s protest in front of the Governor’s Mansion
took place on the same day McKesson filed its petition for a temporary
restraining order. From the standpoint of an impartial and reasonable
observer, Judge Griffen’s conduct directly impeded the state’s interest in
promoting the impartial application of the laws and public perception of the
judiciary.
As Judge Griffen’s interest in free expression is outweighed by the
state’s interest in promoting an impartial judicial system, Judge Griffen could
not successfully allege that he was engaged in a protected activity. Having
failed the first part of the First Amendment retaliation test, Judge Griffen
cannot make a submissible case, and the Eighth Circuit correctly dismissed
Judge Griffen’s First Amendment retaliation claim.

C. The Dangers of Permanent Reassignment
While Judge Griffen did not allege a plausible First Amendment
retaliation claim, the behavior of the Arkansas Supreme Court should be
alarming for those concerned about a restrained judiciary. As Chief Justice
154. See text accompanying supra notes 32–39.
155. See In re Kemp, 894 F.3d 900, 906 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bauer v.
Shepard, 620 F.3d 704, 718 (7th Cir. 2010)) (“[A recusal order] specifies how he ‘will
perform official duties,’ or rather, to which duties he is assigned.”).
156. Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974 (7th Cir. 2010).
157. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 446 (2015) (quoting A.T.
Massey Co. v. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 889) (“public perception of judicial integrity is
‘a state interest of the highest order.’”).
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Kemp noted in his dissent, the Arkansas Supreme Court has established
procedures for investigating the ethical complaints against members of the
judiciary.158 Given the immediate nature of a temporary restraining order,
reassigning the McKesson case away from Judge Griffen was a prudent move.
But in permanently reassigning all cases involving the death penalty
away from Judge Griffen sua sponte, the Arkansas Supreme Court determined
that Judge Griffen’s conduct forever tainted his judgment in capital cases
without an investigation into his actions. Judge Griffen should not be
permanently barred from hearing cases involving the death penalty without an
explicit commitment to rule a certain way in a capital case. Judge Griffen
alleged that he has never made such a claim. Indeed, in a blog post on “Justice
is a verb!” one year after the events in question, Judge Griffen wrote “I will
follow [Arkansas law] whenever my authority to preside over capital cases is
restored. I took an oath to follow the law, including laws that I consider
objectionable on moral and religious grounds.”159
Permanent reassignment is a drastic remedy that should rarely, if ever,
be used by the judiciary. Temporary reassignment, while uncommon,
functions to ensure the due process right to a fair trial in front of an impartial
judge.160 Reassignment plays an important role in maintaining judicial
integrity at the state and federal level.161 Since the judiciary is reliant “on the
public’s willingness to respect and follow its decisions,”162 reassignment can
be used to insulate the judiciary from questions of improper bias.
On the other hand, permanent reassignment opens up a plethora of
options to the judiciary. Hyper-partisan judges from a state’s highest court
may attempt to weaponize permanent reassignment for quick political gain.
In a judicial system that is rooted in the concept of an independent and
impartial judiciary, allowing permanent reassignment to stand is a dangerous
game.
When the opportunity arises, courts should decide to seal off the
possibility of permanent reassignment. Indeed, in a First Amendment
retaliation case, it is plausible that permanent reassignment could amount to a
constructive discharge. Perhaps armed with a better First Amendment case, a
future judge may be able to successfully argue that permanent reassignment
is an infringement on the judiciary’s First Amendment rights.

158. In re Pulaski County Circuit Court, No. 17-155, 2017 Ark. LEXIS 154
(2017) at *3 (Kemp, C.J., dissenting).
159. Griffen, supra note 4.
160. Toby J. Heytens, Reassignment, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2014).
161. Id. As of 2014, 668 cases had been reassigned to different judges at the
federal level. Id.
162. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 446 (2015) (quoting Caperton v.
A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 889 (2009)).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Judge Griffen’s case provides an interesting look into the difficulties of
preserving the constitutional protections of those who comprise our judiciary.
With the advent of judicial participation in social media163 and a political
climate that encourages judges to enter the political arena,164 courts will likely
see an increase in litigation relating to judicial speech. Courts would be wise
to announce a clear standard for analyzing these claims, as continued litigation
over extrajudicial speech would prove harmful to the judiciary’s image.
Adopting Pickering’s balancing test would protect the due process rights
of litigants and ensure the efficient running of our judicial system, while still
allowing judges to exercise First Amendment rights as private citizens. While
Judge Griffen should follow the call to come into the courthouse with an open
mind, Wendell Griffen, the private citizen, should continue to blog, tweet, and
protest. Of course, a judge who is active in the arena of public debate will be
subject to challenges regarding the judge’s prior statements in a pending case,
but this is the cost of allowing every citizen, regardless of position in our
judicial system, to exercise First Amendment rights.

163. Elizabeth Thornburg, Twitter and the #So-CalledJudge, 71 SMU L. REV.
249 (2018).
164. See Rambo, supra note 57, at 279–81 (discussing Justice Ginsburg’s
comments on then-candidate Donald Trump in 2016).
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